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OPINION* 
____________ 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Augustino Smith petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) denying his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT). For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the petition. 
I 
A native of Jamaica, Smith entered the United States lawfully in 1987 and became 
a legal permanent resident. Ten years later, he was convicted of robbery and controlled 
substance crimes in New Jersey and imprisoned. Smith was removed to Jamaica in 2002, 
and after just two months there, he was assaulted by a group of men. After a conversation 
about America, a man accused Smith of being gay, used “derogatory slurs,” and, along 
with others nearby, “started beating [Smith] up.” App. 38. That night, Smith was kicked 
out of his stepfather’s house for being, in his host’s words, “a faggot.” App. 39. Within 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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days, Smith fled back to the United States and remained here undetected from 2002 to 
2010. 
In 2010, Smith was arrested and convicted for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326(b)(2). After spending five years in prison, Smith’s removal order was reinstated 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). He applied for, inter alia, deferral of removal under the 
CAT. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied this request. 
Smith appealed and the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, finding Smith “has not 
demonstrated that, upon his removal, it is more likely than not that he will be tortured by 
or with the acquiescence (including ‘willful blindness’) of a public official.” App. 7.  
II1 
Because Smith is removable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i) as an 
aggravated felon and controlled substance offender, our review is limited to constitutional 
and legal questions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D). Legal questions include “whether the 
BIA used the correct standard in reviewing the IJ’s decision and whether the BIA 
assigned to the petitioner the correct burden of proof.” Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 
339 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted) (alterations omitted). We review legal questions de 
novo. Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 2012). 
III 
                                                 
1 The IJ had jurisdiction to determine Smith’s eligibility for CAT protection and 
the BIA had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e). We generally 
review the BIA’s opinion as a final agency decision, but where, as here, the BIA “invokes 
specific aspects of the IJ’s analysis and fact-finding,” we review both decisions. Green v. 
Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 
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Smith claims the BIA erred when it affirmed the IJ’s decision denying him CAT 
relief. Under the implementing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18, an alien may not be 
removed to a country where “it is more likely than not that [he] will be tortured.” Gomez-
Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 349 (3d Cir. 2008). Whether torture will likely 
occur depends on two questions: “(1) what is likely to happen to the petitioner if 
removed; and (2) does what is likely to happen amount to the legal definition of torture?” 
Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010). The first is an unreviewable 
factual question, but the second is a cognizable legal question. The legal definition of 
torture requires, among other things, acquiescence in the activity by the relevant 
government. See Green, 694 F.3d at 507. 
Smith claims the BIA’s “legal analysis is fatally flawed” for several reasons. 
Smith Br. 17. We will address his principal arguments in turn. 
A 
Smith first argues that the IJ and BIA erred by failing to discuss whether the 
Jamaican government acquiesced in his 2002 beating. See Smith Br. 21 (claiming the 
BIA “fail[ed] to mention, or even account for, [his] evidence that police officers 
witnessed, but took no action to prevent, the severe beating he suffered in 2002”). 
Although the IJ and BIA did not specifically discuss the police officers near the 
2002 altercation, it is inaccurate to say they did not consider that fact. After Smith 
testified at his hearing, “when I was being attacked the police [were] there and did 
nothing,” the IJ responded, “I understand that and I appreciate all the documents that you 
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submitted and your testimony today.” App. 104. The IJ went on to cite the correct 
standard for government acquiescence in torture and concluded that the 2002 beating was 
not “torture by the government in any way, shape, or form.” App. 40. The BIA likewise 
“recognize[d] the applicant’s testimony regarding the incident of harm” before agreeing it 
wasn’t probative of the likelihood of future torture. App. 7. 
More importantly, the IJ found (and the BIA agreed) that the country conditions 
were such that the Jamaican government was unlikely to participate or acquiesce in any 
future torture of Smith. The IJ specifically discussed country conditions, finding they 
have improved. See App. 41 (noting the “significant strides” taken since the Ninth 
Circuit’s finding in Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008), that Jamaican 
country conditions were egregious towards gay men in 2005). The IJ found that while 
“there’s still discrimination and bullying . . . by members of the general public in 
Jamaica,” and the police need to do more, “individual police officers [have] express[ed] 
sympathy for the plight of the LGBT community and [are] work[ing] to prevent and 
resolve instances of abuse.” App. 42. Therefore, the IJ concluded Smith “has not met his 
burden” with respect to the likelihood of the government’s involvement in torturing 
LGBT individuals. Id.  
The IJ and BIA also correctly stated the level of government involvement 
necessary for torture under the CAT—the government must be willfully blind to or 
acquiesce in the requisite treatment, Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 70 (3d Cir. 
2007)—before concluding the government’s actions would not meet this threshold. After 
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mentioning Jamaica’s country conditions and Smith’s past experience, the BIA found that 
the “discrimination, harassment, and occasional acts of violence” in Jamaica were 
insufficient to produce the requisite likelihood of torture. App. 7. The BIA affirmed the 
IJ’s decision on this point, finding the IJ “properly considered the applicant’s claim, and 
properly concluded that he did not meet his burden.” Id.  
It appears that Smith’s real dispute with respect to the police incident is with the 
IJ’s and BIA’s determination that the government is not likely to acquiesce in torture 
upon his return. On his view, the 2002 beating coupled with the country evidence about 
violence toward LGBT individuals in Jamaica is enough to demonstrate a sufficient 
likelihood of torture under the CAT standard. But the IJ and BIA weighed the evidence 
differently, and assertions “that an Immigration Judge or the BIA incorrectly weighed 
evidence [or] failed to consider evidence . . . are not questions of law under 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).” Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations 
omitted). Thus, we don’t have jurisdiction to review the IJ’s and BIA’s determination that 
the Jamaican government is not likely to acquiesce in any torture of Smith. See Green, 
694 F.3d at 507. 
 Since the IJ and BIA reviewed the 2002 incident, as required by 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(c)(3)(i), along with improved country conditions, in making their 
determination that it was not likely for the government to acquiesce in any torture upon 
his return, Smith could not prove his case under the CAT standard. See Green, 694 F.3d 
at 507. Accordingly, the IJ was not required to address whether the 2002 incident 
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involved acquiescence by the police. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) 
(“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the 
decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).  
B 
 Smith also contends that the IJ and BIA ignored probative evidence of likely 
future torture: a letter submitted to the IJ by his mother, Veronica Smith, expressing fear 
for her son’s safety in Jamaica based on threats she heard. Smith claims it was legal error 
for the IJ and BIA to fail to “mention the letter from [his] mother explaining that, on trips 
to Jamaica she had taken since [he] was incarcerated in 2010, she was approached” and 
told that “if he was to be sent back to Jamaica [she] would be buying a black dress.” 
Smith Br. 23. 
 Smith is right that “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture” must 
be considered. Pieschacon-Villegas, 671 F.3d 303, 313 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.16(c)(3)) (finding BIA at fault for not considering several pieces of evidence, 
including “threats allegedly made against [the petitioner] and his family”). The IJ and 
BIA “lack[] authority to ignore” any evidence relevant to future torture. Id. at 314. In 
applying this rule, we have reversed BIA decisions when they “totally ignore[] the most 
forceful record evidence” supporting the petitioner. Kang v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 
166 (3d Cir. 2010) (several clear instances of past torture). 
 At the same time, an IJ’s opinion need “not specifically discuss every individual 
piece of evidence.” Green, 694 F.3d at 509. It suffices if the IJ accepts lengthy testimony 
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from the petitioner along with all of his “submitted documentary evidence,” and makes 
“clear that [he] had ‘considered all of the evidence of record.’” Id. at 509 (alterations and 
citation omitted).  
 In this case, although the IJ didn’t discuss Smith’s mother’s letter in his oral 
decision, he unquestionably accepted it as documentary evidence. While reviewing all 
submitted evidence during the hearing, the IJ stated “there appears to be a letter from 
Veronica Smith.” App. 54. Smith then asked the IJ whether he had the letter. The IJ 
confirmed receipt of the letter and admitted it into evidence. And after Smith’s testimony, 
shortly before the IJ “dictate[d] [his] oral decision,” the IJ told Smith: “I appreciate all 
the documents that you submitted and your testimony today.” App. 104 (emphasis 
added). As in Green, the presumption applies that when an IJ states that he reviewed the 
record, he actually “consider[ed] all relevant record evidence in rendering [his] decision.” 
694 F.3d at 508. 
 In any event, the letter from Smith’s mother was not so important as to require an 
in-depth discussion to demonstrate that the IJ “truly performed a full review of the 
record.” Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 388 (3d Cir. 2010). The letter recounts 
threats from anonymous private actors and does not rebut the IJ’s conclusion—after 
looking at country conditions and reports from both sides—that the government is not 
likely to acquiesce in violence against Smith.  
 We are satisfied both that the IJ did evaluate the letter along with all other record 
evidence and that the IJ and BIA were not required to specifically discuss it given their 
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other conclusions regarding the absence of government acquiescence in any future 
torture. And to the extent that Smith “quarrels over the exercise of discretion” to not 
discuss the letter at length, this contention doesn’t raise a question of law. Cospito v. Att’y 
Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citation omitted). 
IV 
 We have considered all of Smith’s other arguments and find them unmeritorious. 
Accordingly, we will dismiss Smith’s petition for review. 
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